Dr. Ikramul Haq & Abdul Rauf Shakoori
patā ab tak nahīñ badlā hamārā
vahī ghar hai vahī qissa hamārā
vahī TuuTī huī kashtī hai apnī
vahī Thahrā huā dariyā hamārā
ye maqtal bhī hai aur kunj-e-amāñ bhī
ye dil ye be-nishāñ kamra hamārā
kisī jānib nahīñ khulte darīche
kahīñ jaatā nahīñ rasta hamārā
ham apnī dhuup meñ baiThe haiñ ‘mushtāq’
hamāre saath hai saayā hamārā
[Ahmad Mustaq]
The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan [“the Constitution”], under Part XI, Article 239, grants Parliament authority to amend any of its provisions. The constitutional amendment may originate in either House of Parliament, but it requires a two-thirds majority of the total members for passage. The Twenty-seventh Constitutional Amendment Bill, introduced in the Senate on November 8, 2025, was passed by a two-thirds majority on November 10, 2025, and subsequently sent to the National Assembly for consideration.
The amendment establishes a Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) and introduces wide ranging textual and structural revisions across more than twenty Articles of the Constitution. The stated reason for the amendment is to ensure specialized adjudication of constitutional matters, thereby allowing the Supreme Court to concentrate on civil and criminal appeals. The model draws inspiration from jurisdictions such as Germany, Italy, and Turkey, where constitutional courts exist as a separate entity.
The new Chapter 1A, comprising Articles 175B to 175L, defines the Court’s structure, jurisdiction, and composition. The Court possesses original jurisdiction over disputes between governments, limited appellate jurisdiction in constitutional matters, and advisory and review powers.
The Chief Justice will serve a three-year term or until reaches the age of sixty-eight, whichever occurs earlier. The President may appoint the first Chief Justice on the Prime Minister’s advice. Judges of the Supreme Court or High Courts who decline appointments to the new court will be deemed to have retired.
The amendment also redefines the Judicial Commission of Pakistan, inserting parliamentary representation and a technocrat member. The reconfiguration diminishes the judicial majority that has historically controlled appointments since the Al-Jihad Trust case, effectively shifting influence back to the legislature. However, the supporters describe this as an effort to balance institutional powers on the contrary, it is viewed as encroachment upon judicial independence.
The amendment further revises Article 243, abolishing the office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and reordering senior military command structures. It strengthens immunity for the President and Governors under Article 248 and imposes new procedural requirements across multiple Articles involving the judiciary.
The creation of a Federal Constitutional Court fulfills an old political commitment. The Charter of Democracy singed by the leadership of both Pakistan Peoples Party and Pakistan Muslim League (N) in 2006, envisaged such a court to handle constitutional questions, whereas the Supreme and High Courts retained their regular jurisdictions. Parliament has now converted that political pledge into constitutional reality. The constitutional philosophy behind the amendment is specialization, but its practical foundation lies in redistribution of power.
The Supreme Court, over the decades, has exercised jurisdiction beyond its constitutional limits, from removing elected prime ministers to fixing administrative prices. The judiciary’s self-expansion under Article 184(3) has often blurred the boundary between law and politics. The Twenty-sixth Amendment had curtailed the suo motu jurisdiction, and the Twenty-Seventh now replaces much of that space with the Federal Constitutional Court. In theory, this separation could promote clarity in practice, it might simply reposition controversy.
The measure’s implications are profound when viewed through the lens of constitutional political economy (CPE), a discipline that examines how political incentives shape constitutional design and institutional outcomes. In Pakistan, constitutional engineering has historically been reactive, not reformist. Each amendment has emerged from a political deadlock rather than a long-term institutional vision. The Twenty-Seventh amendment reflects that trend. The government, instead of building judicial discipline through accountability and transparency, used parliament to redesign the structure itself.
The economic dimension of this amendment is often overlooked. Constitutional uncertainty imposes heavy transaction costs on governance and investment. Similarly, frequent restructuring of the judiciary signals instability to both domestic and foreign stakeholders. The establishment of a new court will require significant administrative expenditure, judicial staffing, and infrastructure investment, diverting public resources without guaranteeing functional efficiency. The constitutional economy depends not merely on institutional variety but on institutional credibility.
The legislature’s repeated reliance on amendments rather than enforcement reveals a deeper pathology. These constitutional amendments fail to restore public faith in governance. Similarly, citizens no longer trust the executive, Parliament, judiciary, or law enforcement agencies. The reason lies not in the text of the Constitution but in the absence of institutional integrity. Additionally, no government has seriously invested in capacity building, accountability, or merit-based autonomy within state organs. Parliament has preferred to rewrite rather than to reform.
The judiciary, too, bears responsibility. Its historical validation of extra-constitutional actions, from the Dosso case to more recent interventions in political matters, has eroded constitutional sanctity. Similarly, parliament’s reluctance to hold it accountable has fostered a cycle of constitutional manipulation. The legislature responds not through inquiry or institutional correction but by introducing another amendment, each time the courts overstep. The result is constitutional fatigue, a state where form evolves but function remains stagnant.
From the CPE perspective, the amendment reflects the tension between power preservation and institutional symmetry. The judiciary’s autonomy had grown into dominance, provoking legislative powers. The creation of the FCC may appear as balance, but balance achieved through political motivation rarely produces stability. Moreover, constitutional political economy teaches that durable institutions arise when incentives align with collective welfare, not when one power center neutralizes another.
The measure of success will rest not in the creation of a new court but in whether it restores coherence, accountability, and faith in justice. The risk is that Pakistan’s constitutional evolution once again becomes an exercise in redistribution of authority rather than reform of governance. The real challenge lies in nurturing constitutional behavioural ethics of restraint, responsibility, and integrity that no amendment alone can achieve. The broader objective must be to cultivate institutions that command respect through performance, not position, and ensure justice is seen as impartial and accessible. The Parliament has spoken with constitutional authority, but the question remains whether it has spoken with constitutional wisdom.
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Dr. Ikramul Haq, an advocate of the Supreme Court and writer is an adjunct faculty at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS). Abdul Rauf Shakoori is a corporate lawyer based in the USA.