Dr. Ikramul Haq & Engineer Arshad H Abbasi
In the sphere of transboundary water relations, the conduct of upstream states is critical to maintaining peace, fostering cooperation, and ensuring regional stability. The approaches of two major Asian powers—China and India—could not be more divergent. China has consistently demonstrated restraint, responsibility, and goodwill as an upper riparian, particularly in its engagement with India over the Brahmaputra River. India, by contrast, in its dealings with Pakistan, has exhibited a persistent pattern of hostility, systematic violations of binding agreements, and conduct that approaches criminality under international law.
On August 8, 2025, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) delivered a decisive ruling in Pakistan’s favour on the general interpretation of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). The court reaffirmed that India is legally bound to allow the waters of the western rivers to flow for Pakistan’s unrestricted use, asserting its jurisdiction despite India’s objections and its unilateral April 2025 decision to suspend the treaty.
The PCA confirmed—unanimously—that it was properly constituted and competent to adjudicate the disputes identified in Pakistan’s request for arbitration. This represented a comprehensive endorsement of Pakistan’s long-standing legal position and a clear repudiation of India’s attempt to evade its treaty obligations. Once more, with cold indifference, India turned its back on the ruling of the PCA — a refusal that deepens wounds instead of healing them.
A comparison of India’s conduct with that of China reveals a stark difference in approach. The Brahmaputra River originates in China, passes through northeastern India, and flows into Bangladesh. Since 1998, China has constructed six hydropower dams on this river. The most prominent, the Zangmu Dam, is 381 feet high, generates 510 MW, and stores 70,208 acre-feet of water. In more than a decade of operation, it has never been implicated in disrupting downstream flows. Importantly, despite the absence of any formal water-sharing treaty, India has never raised objections to China’s operational practices—an implicit acknowledgement of China’s non-interference.
On 30 June 2014, China voluntarily entered into an Implementation Plan with India to provide real-time hydrological data during the annual flood season. Under this arrangement, China transmitted digital data twice daily, covering rainfall, water levels, and discharge, supported by trial runs, emergency alerts, and rating curve adjustments for accuracy. This transparent, consistent, and voluntary sharing of critical information—absent any binding legal requirement—stands as a model of cooperative conduct in international river management.
India’s approach in the Indus River Basin could not be more different. Under Article VI of the 1960 IWT, India is legally obliged to share hydrological data on the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, and the three eastern rivers with Pakistan.
However, for decades, India has complied in only the most perfunctory way. Rather than providing real-time, verifiable digital data—as China does for India—India dispatches delayed hard-copy reports by post, frequently of questionable accuracy. The reliability of these submissions is uncertain—perhaps known only to Indian officials or, as some have sardonically remarked, to Bhagwan, whose influence seems minimal in the Modi era.
The rupture deepened on 23 April 2025, when India unilaterally and unlawfully suspended the IWT—one of the few enduring instruments of cooperation between the two states. This act is more than a breach of bilateral trust; it is a direct violation of international water law, particularly the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, which codifies the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization, the obligation to prevent significant harm, and the duty to cooperate.
India’s violations extend into operational sabotage. It has repeatedly manipulated the Baglihar Dam on the Chenab River under the pretext of “flushing the reservoir,” a process normally undertaken during monsoon months to remove silt. Instead, India has executed these operations during low-flow periods, creating acute shortages downstream precisely when Pakistan most needs water for irrigation, domestic supply, and economic activity.
Such acts are not engineering necessities, but deliberate measures aimed at undermining Pakistan’s agricultural productivity and economic stability. Under international humanitarian law, the intentional targeting of civilian infrastructure—including water resources—during peacetime can amount to a war crime.
The brazenness of this approach was confirmed when Prime Minister Narendra Modi publicly celebrated these actions at a political rally in Ahmedabad, proclaiming, “This is how we punish Pakistan”. Such an explicit admission of weaponizing water is virtually unprecedented in modern state practice and reveals an openly coercive policy.
Pakistan’s weak institutional response has compounded the problem. Since 1960, it has failed to develop the technical expertise and legal capacity necessary to confront India’s breaches effectively or to sustain robust advocacy in international forums. Losses in arbitration have not been the result of weak legal claims, but of poor preparation, deficient inter-agency coordination, and chronic political inertia. These institutional shortcomings have emboldened India to act with increasing impunity.
In contrast, China’s conduct as an upper riparian reflects mutual respect and adherence to established norms. Even without binding treaty obligations, China has consistently provided India with accurate, timely, and transparent hydrological data.
There have been no credible allegations of data manipulation, no threats to weaponize flows, and no politicisation of dam operations. This behavior accords with the fundamental principles of customary international law on shared watercourses: the duty to prevent significant harm, the obligation to provide prior notification and consultation, and the commitment to exchange relevant information in good faith.
The divergence could not be more pronounced. India has positioned itself as one of the most aggressive and confrontational upper riparian states in the world—openly breaching legal commitments, weaponizing essential water flows, publicly admitting to punitive measures, and dismantling a treaty that once stood as a rare symbol of cooperation. China—while assertive in other geopolitical arenas—has quietly honored its responsibilities on the Brahmaputra, Mekong, and Irrawaddy Rivers without resorting to coercion or politicization.
For Pakistan, already facing severe water scarcity, effective transboundary water governance must be built on cooperation, transparency, and accountability, not coercion, delay, or unilateralism. The stability of South Asia will depend on whether upstream states choose to exercise hydrological power with restraint and legal responsibility—or with arrogance and impunity.
At present, China exemplifies responsible riparian conduct. India, on the other hand, has adopted a strategy of deliberate water weaponization, posing a serious threat not only to Pakistan’s survival but to the stability of the entire region. The international community must compel India to restore the Indus Waters Treaty in its original form, in both letter and spirit, and confront this imbalance by holding India to the highest standards of legal compliance and ethical conduct it demands from others.
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Dr. Ikramul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court, Adjunct Faculty at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), member Advisory Board and Visiting Senior Fellow of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), holds LLD in tax laws. He was full-time journalist from 1979 to 1984 with Viewpoint and Dawn. He also served Civil Services of Pakistan from 1984 to 1996.
Engineer Arshad H. Abbasi, water and climate change expert, is co-founder of Energy Excellence Centres at NUST and UET Peshawar