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IMF’s tax trap for budget 2026-27-I

Pakistan's fiscal surrender to lenders Dr. Ikramul Haq "A difficult business environment, weak governance, and an outsized role of the state hinder investment, which remains very low compared to peers, while the tax base remains too narrow to ensure tax fairness, fiscal sustainability and meet Pakistan's large social and development spending needs"-IMF Country Report No. 24/310, October 10, 2024 This series intends to systematically examine the tax and fiscal conditionalities imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under the ongoing US$7 billion 37-month Extended Fund Facility (EFF), especially those shaping the forthcoming federal budget for fiscal year 2026-27. Based on IMF programme documents, review reports and official statements issued between September 2024 and May 2026, the series will analyse over two dozen explicit and implicit taxation-related conditions, benchmarks, contingency measures and structural commitments affecting Pakistan's fiscal sovereignty, growth prospects and constitutional federalism. These include expansion of withholding tax regimes, withdrawal of exemptions, increase in Federal Excise Duty (FED), broadening of General Sales Tax (GST), harmonisation of agricultural income tax, retailer taxation, contingency mini-budget measures, restrictions on tax incentives and repeated upward pressure on revenue targets to secure primary budget surplus. The series will also critically examine whether these prescriptions can stabilise an already vulnerable economy facing severe shockwaves from the widening Gulf conflict, rising energy costs, external sector pressures and growth stagnation, or whether they may instead accelerate economic contraction, inflation, unemployment and fiscal dependence. Pakistan is once again entering a federal budget season under the shadow of International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionalities. The difference this time, however, is that the country is facing an altogether different geopolitical and economic environment. The widening Gulf conflict, disruption in oil supply routes, volatile liquified natural gas (LNG) markets, soaring shipping insurance premiums, remittance vulnerabilities and the possibility of prolonged regional instability have made Pakistan's economy far more fragile than what IMF spreadsheets assume. Yet the lender of last resort continues to prescribe a familiar recipe: higher taxes, additional levies, expanded withholding regimes and harsher fiscal extraction from an already exhausted economy. The ongoing US$ 7 billion 37-month Extended Fund Facility (EFF), approved in September 2024, is being projected by the government as a "stabilisation success". In reality, it is gradually transforming into a mechanism for perpetual fiscal tightening in a stagnating economy. The repeated reviews under the programme reveal that IMF's principal obsession remains achievement of numerical revenue targets and primary surplus, irrespective of the devastating impact on growth, employment, investment and social stability. The latest IMF review documents and press releases expose the true contours of the tax agenda now shaping Federal Budget 2026-27. The conditions are no longer limited to broad fiscal reforms or institutional restructuring. They now directly intrude into taxation policy at micro level, dictating which sectors must be taxed, which exemptions withdrawn, which goods subjected to Federal Excise Duty (FED), and what contingency mini-budget measures should be triggered if revenue collection falls short. The irony is painful. Pakistan is facing perhaps the gravest external economic risks since the post-9/11 era, yet the response of both IMF and local policymakers is to squeeze the formal economy further. The IMF programme insists that Pakistan must maintain ambitious primary budget surplus targets even if growth weakens sharply due to external shocks. To ensure this, authorities have already committed themselves to "contingency revenue measures" in case Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) fails to meet targets. These measures include increase in FED on fertilisers and pesticides by five percentage points, additional excise duties on sugary products, and shifting selected goods from concessional general sales tax (GST) schedules to the standard sales tax regime. The consequences of such measures for agriculture, food inflation and manufacturing costs are obvious. Yet these risks appear secondary in the arithmetic of programme compliance. Even before these contingency measures, the tax burden imposed under the current EFF is already unprecedented. Higher withholding taxes on banking transactions, profit on debt, dividends, services and commercial activities have converted Pakistan into perhaps the most over-withheld economy in the world. Taxes are no longer confined to income; they are now imposed on existence, consumption, mobility and transactions. Millions who are outside taxable income thresholds continue paying advance and adjustable taxes merely because they use mobile phones, banking channels or digital services. The IMF narrative continues to portray Pakistan's problem as one of "low tax collection". That diagnosis is only partially correct. Pakistan certainly has a narrow and punctured tax base, but the real crisis lies elsewhere. The overwhelming burden of taxation falls on already documented sectors while politically protected wealth remains largely outside effective taxation. This imbalance has worsened under every IMF programme because indirect and withholding taxes are administratively easier to collect than progressive direct taxation on elites. The latest IMF review openly acknowledges that provinces are required to align agricultural income tax with federal income tax structures. In principle, this is correct and long overdue. For decades, rich absentee landlords-including many belonging to the militro-judicial-civil complex-have escaped effective taxation. However, the tragedy is that while genuine agricultural taxation remains weak, the federal government continues imposing indirect taxes on fertilisers, diesel, electricity and pesticides, thereby burdening ordinary cultivators rather than wealthy landowners. Similarly, the insistence on expanding GST and FED in a war-driven inflationary environment is economically irrational. Pakistan dangerously depends on imported oil, LNG and external remittance inflows. Any prolonged Gulf conflict can simultaneously raise import costs, weaken remittances and disrupt external financing conditions. Under such circumstances, increasing indirect taxes will not stabilise the economy; it will deepen stagflation. The obsession with numerical targets is also destroying the credibility of fiscal governance. FBR repeatedly blocks refunds, extracts advance taxes not due, resorts to coercive recoveries and overburdens existing taxpayers to create artificial revenue figures. Despite all this, shortfalls continue to widen. In the current fiscal year alone, FBR suffered massive deficits against revised targets despite oppressive taxation and extraordinary administrative pressure. The real issue ignored by IMF is that taxes are by-products of economic growth, not substitutes for it. When growth slows, industries shrink, agriculture weakens, energy costs explode and purchasing power collapses, higher taxes merely accelerate economic contraction. Pakistan's experience over the last many years conclusively proves this reality. The more aggressive the tax extraction became, the larger the informal economy grew. The ongoing EFF also reflects another dangerous trend: erosion of parliamentary sovereignty in fiscal matters. Revenue targets approved by the National Assembly are routinely revised after consultations with IMF missions. Fiscal policy increasingly appears to be negotiated between Q Block and IMF staff rather than debated in Parliament. This growing subordination undermines constitutional federalism and democratic accountability. The IMF is correct in demanding documentation, rationalisation and reduction of exemptions. It is also correct that Pakistan cannot survive indefinitely with a tiny formal tax base and perpetual borrowing. However, the proposed route is fundamentally flawed because it relies on fiscal coercion without structural transformation. Pakistan's fiscal crisis is not simply a revenue problem. It is primarily a governance and expenditure problem. Reckless borrowing, wasteful state expenditure, loss-making state-owned enterprises, tax expenditures benefiting elites, unconstitutional petroleum levy manipulations, retention of devolved ministries after the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment, and the gigantic size of the federal apparatus constitute the real roots of the crisis. Yet these areas receive far less urgency than taxing fertilisers, mobile users and documented businesses. The country desperately needs a growth-oriented alternative framework. The objective should be low-rate, broad-based and predictable taxation combined with radical expenditure rationalisation and institutional restructuring. Instead of squeezing documented sectors through punitive taxation, Pakistan must move towards simplification, digitisation, corporatisation and voluntary compliance. The existing tax machinery, designed around fear and extraction, is incapable of delivering sustainable fiscal stability. The Gulf crisis has changed the entire economic landscape of the region. Oil prices, freight costs, strategic alignments and remittance patterns may remain unstable for years. In such circumstances, imposing further IMF-inspired taxation shocks in Budget 2026-27 may become economically disastrous and politically explosive. Pakistan requires a serious national debate. The question is no longer whether reforms are needed. The real question is whether reforms should aim at economic revival and social stability, or merely satisfy quarterly review targets drafted in Washington. Unless policymakers understand this distinction, Budget 2026-27 may become another chapter in Pakistan's long history of fiscal extraction without prosperity, taxation without growth and stabilisation without development. [To be continued] ___________________________________________________________________ Dr. Ikramul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court, Adjunct Faculty at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), member Advisory Board and Visiting Senior Fellow of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), holds an LLD in tax laws. He was full-time journalist from 1979 to 1984 with Viewpoint and Dawn. He also served Civil Services of Pakistan from 1984 to 1996.

The IMF's tax trap for budget 2026-27 series: IMF's tax trap for budget 2026-27-II

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